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Abstract
This paper examines how public goods get allocated by a centralized state. We use
data on social structure and public goods in rural India over the sixties, seventies and
eighties to examine the inﬂuence of particular social groups, and of social and economic
heterogeneity more generally, on the availability of public goods. This was a period of
rapid expansion in these goods and of important shifts in the political leverage enjoyed
by diﬀerent groups. We ﬁnd that social divisions are important, but so are the relative
positions of particular groups in the broader social hierarchy. These divisions are not
however immutable, nor is their inﬂuence overwhelming. Some previously marginalized
communities have gained over this period while others continue to be disadvantaged.
There has also been considerable convergence in the availability of public goods over
this period, suggesting that the state feels some compulsion to equalize access, even to
those who are not politically inﬂuential.
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11 Introduction
At least since the work of Robert Bates (1981), political economists have emphasized the
key role of ethnic divisions in the development process. In Bates’ narrative, states became
the captive of speciﬁc dominant groups and served them, at the cost of the economy as a
whole.
A series of papers that started with the work of Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) (see
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Baland and Platteau (1998), Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson
(2001), Dayton-Johnson (2000) and Miguel (1999)) take a more ex ante view of the same
problem. These papers aruge that in ethnically or economically heterogenous populations
there is greater potential for certain groups dominating others, ` a la Bates, because groups
have more contact with each other. They then demonstrate that in the data, more heteroge-
nous communities are associated with a reduced level of access to local public goods. Their
interpretation of these results is that more heterogeneous communities get less because they
are less able to work together to extract public goods from a recalcitrant state.1
Our paper shares with this later literature the premise that access to public goods is not
necessarily automatic or rule-bound and that group heterogeneity may play an important
role in determining public good allocations. On other hand, like Bates, we emphasize the
importance of the existing diﬀerences in the power and inﬂuence of diﬀerent groups, leading
them to secure diﬀerent levels of access to public goods. Also like Bates, we are interested
in the ﬂuidity of this power structure; the relative power of diﬀerent groups can change
dramatically over time, especially in countries experiencing economic and political transfor-
mation. Political power may get diﬀused as democratic institutions establish themselves,
giving political voice to previously marginalized social groups and introducing greater politi-
cal competition. Or traditional land-owning groups may lose ground to groups that dominate
the emerging industrial class.
Finally we do not take as given that the demand side factors emphasized in this literature,
namely the ability of groups to extract what they want from the state, are necessarily more
important than the supply side factors: Electoral pressures, pressures from civil society and
the judiciary, pressures from the outside world and the force of social norms, might compel
1Related to this, Easterly and Levine (1997) have argued that ethnic conﬂicts can explain a signiﬁcant
part of ”Africa’s Growth Tragedy”
2the state to deliver public goods even to those who are in no position to extract them. The
desegregation of the U.S. South was at least as much a result of such internal pressures as it
was a consequence of unrest among the Blacks.2
We use parliamentary constituency-level data from rural India to examine these issues. Rural
India is in many ways an ideal place to study the importance of social structure on public
good provision: First, because the caste-based social hierarchy within rural Indian society,
and social divisions more generally, are well-documented and easily identiﬁed in the data.
Second, because there is enough variation in the social structure across these constituencies
for us to be able to estimate these relationships based on the variation within each Indian
state. The formal institutional structure within states is more or less uniform, and decisions
on the location of most public goods are made by state governments. Finally, we consider a
period of dramatic expansion in public goods. This allows us to identify the impact of our
variables by using diﬀerences in availability over the period and avoids the bias associated
with omitted variables if their values and inﬂuence are time-invariant.
The next section brieﬂy describes the institutional structure through which public goods
are provided in India and provides some historical background on policies relating to such
provision. We then discuss our data sources (Section 3) and lay out the rationale for our
empirical approach (Section 4). Section 5 ﬁrst presents results on the relation between the
level of public goods in the 1960s (based on the 1971 census) and various aspects of social
structure in our current data set and then proceeds to examine inﬂuences on the growth
of provision in the seventies and eighties.3 Since we are primarily interested in the change
in access to public goods between 1971 and 1991, we restrict ourselves to the public goods
that are deﬁned in a roughly consistent manner over the two decades. There are a total of
16 such goods spanning a range of categories: education, health, water and communication
facilities.
2Khwaja (2002) makes an argument parallel to ours, suggesting that technical competence may have as
big an impact on access to public goods as social heterogeneity.
3The results relating to the level of public goods in 1971 are based on a speciﬁcation that is similar
to the one used in our earlier work. Banerjee and Somanathan (2001), contains results on three parallel
cross-sections based on census data from 1971, 1981 and 1991. The follow-up paper by Banerjee (2004) gets
similar results after including additional controls for a speciﬁc set of historical factors. Both these papers
use a district level data set while the present data set, though largely constructed from the same source, is at
the parliamentary constituency level. This allows us to better understand political inﬂuences on the access
to public goods.
3Our results based on the 1971 data suggest that the standard measure of ethno-linguistic
fragmentation applied to caste and religious divisions has a negative relation with access
to public goods. This has been a common ﬁnding in most of the available literature on
the eﬀects of social heterogeneity using cross-section data. We ﬁnd in addition, however
several other important, and in some ways more systematic, inﬂuences on the availability of
these goods. Constituencies with larger settlements are served better, consistent with the
common view that it is easier to deliver public goods where the population is concentrated.
Economic heterogeneity, measured by the Gini coeﬃcient of landholdings, is positively asso-
ciated with access to public goods. Our results also suggest that particular group identities
have important eﬀects: Areas with a concentration of Brahmans, the traditional priestly
class considered the top of the caste hierarchy, have higher levels of schools and post oﬃces
but do not have systematically higher levels of other goods relative to the set of intermediate
castes. Areas with groups that were recognized as socially and economically marginalized
by the Indian state at the time of independence are associated with lower access. Of these,
the Scheduled Tribes, who have traditionally been low in the Hindu social structure as to be
outside the caste hierarchy, do worse that the Scheduled Castes that have been considered
at the bottom of the Hindu caste hierarchy. Muslim areas do worse, while Christian areas
do better, compared to areas with a high density of the majority Hindu religion. We do not
ﬁnd any systematic eﬀects of commonly used measures of political competition such as the
share of the winning party or the degree of political fragmentation in a constituency in the
1971 national elections (a measure of whether the vote is split across many parties).
These results, while suggestive, have some important shortcomings. To begin with, there is
the problem of history—this evidence does not tell us whether the observed diﬀerences in
public goods resulted mainly from decisions of the current Indian state or whether they are
a legacy of colonial times, when the state clearly had very diﬀerent priorities. The positive
association between Christian concentrations and the existence of schools and hospitals, for
example, might be attributed to the presence of missionaries in these areas over a long period
of time, who helped establish many of the facilities that were later taken over by the state.
Moreover, for many of the goods we consider, the bulk of the expansion in coverage took
place after 1971. In the two decades between 1971 and 1991, primary schools increased by
one-third, high schools doubled and the number of village with electricity went up three-fold.
In 1971, only 3% of all villages had piped water; by 1991 coverage had increased to one-ﬁfth
of all villages. If we attempt to understand the determinants of public good provision using
the data from 1991, we run into an obvious identiﬁcation problem—is it the presence of a
4high school that attracted Brahmans to this area or the other way around? Or is it some
third factor—remoteness, for example, that accounts both for the lack of schools and the
fact that the area still remains in the hands of the Scheduled Tribes.
In view of the above limitations, we focus on changes in availability of public goods between
the two census years. We obtain our empirical speciﬁcation in this case by diﬀerencing the
model for the levels in 1991 and 1971, without imposing the constraint that the coeﬃcients
on our explanatory variables are the same in both years. As a result, explanatory variables in
this speciﬁcation include both levels and changes in our original set of variables. In addition,
we include the level of the public good in 1971 to capture any convergence eﬀects in public
goods. This speciﬁcation provides us with estimates of the coeﬃcient on our explanatory
variable in 1991 as well as estimates of the change in these coeﬃcients over the 1971-1991
period. Estimating the diﬀerenced model helps with the problem of history, since we are
using changes rather than levels of public goods as a dependent variable. It might also
help with the identiﬁcation for the usual reasons. On the other hand, given that social
composition of villages changes slowly in rural India, this model is identiﬁed using relatively
small changes, making it harder to ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant results.
The growth results tell a very diﬀerent story from the 1971 results in one important respect:
The strongest inﬂuence, by far, on the growth of a public good is its initial level. For 13
out of the 15 public goods for which we have data, higher access in 1971, is associated with
slower growth in the subsequent period, controlling for other constituency characteristics.4
This would not be surprising if access to these goods was close to 100% at the start of the
period, in fact it would be almost mechanical. This was however very far from true. The
expansion in public goods during this period, though dramatic relative to the past, resulted
in high rates of coverage only for a small set of goods in a few states. For half of the goods
in our data set, coverage was less than 5% of Indian villages in 1971 and less than 10% in
1991.
We argue that this strong tendency towards convergence in the 1970s and 1980s is best
understood in the context of political agendas of that period. Under Indira Gandhi’s Garibi
Hatao5 program, ﬁrst put forward during her election campaign in 1971, the Indian state,
4We use a total of 16 public goods in this study, but one of these, primary health sub-centers, was
introduced after 1971. We cannot therefore look at the eﬀects of initial levels in this case- they were zero
everywhere. We can however look at the factors inﬂuencing growth over the subsequent period.
5Translated as ”remove poverty”.
5for the ﬁrst time, made an explicit pledge to provide public goods to everyone; other, even
broader commitments were made by subsequent governments. Our results suggest that these
commitments, once made, were relatively binding.
In the diﬀerenced speciﬁcation we ﬁnd evidence of major shifts in the inﬂuence of diﬀerent
social structures. Scheduled Tribe areas and more fragmented areas do worse over time, while
Scheduled Caste areas do better. In contrast with our results for 1971, economic inequality
is associated with slower changes in access. We argue that these results reﬂect in part the
fact that certain groups, such as the Scheduled Castes, are getting organized, but they are
also the result of state initiatives to break down traditional social structures.
We conclude in section 5 with a discussion of what these results might mean.
2 Historical Background
The Indian constitution divides government functions and ﬁnancial authority between the
central and state governments. As in many federal systems, it is the states that are primarily
responsible for health, education and various kinds of community development programs and
state expenditures form about 80% of total government expenditures in these categories. The
states receive large ﬁnancial transfers from the center, to allow them to spend much more
than they can tax. A signiﬁcant part of these transfers are made to implement development
programs that are outlined in the national ﬁve year plans. Local governments, until recently,
have been created at the discretion of individual states and though many in number, they
have very limited ﬁscal powers.6
Access to state-provided basic public goods was severely limited in the pre-independence
period, reﬂecting the articulated policy of the colonial state that public investments need to
be justiﬁed by their direct contribution to the interests of the colonial power. The general
neglect of the basic public goods continued through the early years of post-independence,
which emphasized investments in heavy industry. As a result, in 1971, while 52 per cent of
all Indian villages had primary schools, only 4% had high schools, 25% had paved roads,
6A constitutional ammendment in 1993 forced all states to form village level governments which would
be elected every ﬁve years. Since then their share of government spending has increased to about 6%.
618% had any electricity, 2% had tapped water and 6% percent had any medical facilities.
Oﬃcial statements of the government’s commitment to providing universal access to public
goods started to proliferate in the late 1960s. The ﬁrst explicit statement on universal pri-
mary education was the National Policy on Education of 1968, 21 years after independence.
The Minimum Needs Program, launched during the ﬁfth ﬁve year plan (1974-75), was the
ﬁrst time the state set down explicit norms about access to public goods in rural areas. The
sixth ﬁve year plan (1980-85) makes clear the motivation for setting down these norms: “In
the absence of such a programme, the pressure for investments in the development of infras-
tructure and production sectors left relatively small allocations for social services. Even such
outlays as were available were the ﬁrst to get reduced in any conﬂict of priorities created by
resource constraint. Further, the beneﬁts of social services cannot reach the poorest with-
out conscious eﬀorts to that end...The Minimum Needs programme lays down the urgency
for providing social services according to nationally accepted norms, within a time bound
programme... The programme introduced in the Fifth Plan will continue during the Sixth
Plan. Its components are: (1) Elementary Education (2) Rural Health (3) Rural Water
Supply (4) Rural Roads (5) Rural Electriﬁcation (6) Housing assistance to rural landless
laborers...”.7 The norms included a primary school and safe water within a mile of every
village, paved roads to villages with populations over 1000 and electricity to at least 40%
of villages in every state. A multi-tiered health system was introduced with Health Centers
for large settlements, Primary Health Centers for villages with populations over 30,000 and
Primary Health Sub-Centers for villages of 5,000. Some of these norms were relaxed over
the subsequent period while others became more stringent, depending on what was consid-
ered feasible, but there was, by and large, continuity in the policies relating to public good
provision. In addition to the above programs, special initiatives were introduced to ensure
that these facilities reached marginalized communities. Most plans restate the constitutional
directive to state policy to “promote with special care the educational and economic inter-
ests of weaker sections of the people and in particular of the scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes”.8
The early 1970s thus saw a number of key adjustments in the attitude of the Indian state
towards the delivery of public goods: it clearly became much more explicit about its re-
sponsibilities and made very speciﬁc statements on delivering on these responsibilities. Not
7Planning Commission, Sixth Five Year Plan, Chapter 14.
8Sixth Five Year Plan, Chapter 26.
7accidentally, this was accompanied by a readjustment of the political rhetoric: Indira Gandhi
made the removal of poverty (Garibi Hatao) the cornerstone of her successful election cam-
paign in 1971 and it became increasingly common for election campaigns to be fought on
the basis of who would deliver the (public) goods.9
Consistent with political and policy statements, the two decades after 1971 saw a very
substantial expansion of public facilities. As can be seen from Table 1a, the fraction of
villages with primary schools went up by about a third, high schools doubled, villages with
electricity almost quadrupled, the fraction with phone connections went up by a factor of ﬁve
and those with piped water increased nearly eight-fold. Clearly the state felt a compulsions
to deliver on its new commitments.
What is less clear is to what extent these compulsions were internal compulsions, driven by
the imperatives of the bureaucracy that was assigned the task of implementing the programs
that had been announced to the public, and to what extent it was a result of pressures from
speciﬁc constituencies. A part of the problem is that it is not clear how pressures from outside
get exerted: Locally provided goods are not locally ﬁnanced and decisions about where to
build a school or a road are taken at the state level or even at the central level. While the
process by which these governments allocate the public goods is not transparent and probably
quite complex, it is plausible that the ability of communities to collectively articulate their
demands to politicians and administrators is important in determining their location. Such
articulation may involve informing politicians that the provision of these goods is important
for their reelection, visits to district administrators who implement development plans or it
may mean local contributions of land or labor which allow the building of schools and health
facilities.10 All of this is presumably easier for those groups that are good at working together;
social fragmentation is therefore likely to matter. On the other hand being politically well-
9Today this is entirely the norm: the 1998 elections to the Madhya Pradesh state government were won by
the incumbent party partly based on the new Education Guarantee Scheme, but they lost the 2003 elections,
when the opposition successfully made the case that they failed to deliver water, roads and electricity. The
National Elections of 2004 saw a marked anti-incumbency wave and the post election survey by Center for
the Study of Developing Societies found widespread dissatisfaction on the part of the electorate with basic
infrastructural facilities
10The south Indian village studied by Epstein et al.(1998), had many facilities that were unusual for a
village of its size-they obtained piped water as a result of meetings between the village council and the
district administration, a high school was sanctioned after one of village families provided a building, and a
health Center was constructed after the villagers donated land for it.
8connected or having the ability to articulate demands eﬀectively ought to help; everything
else being same, areas with a high density of brahmans or other elite groups will do better
than scheduled tribe dominated areas. Having a landed elite might also help for this reason,
though it might also hurt because economic inequality can undermine collective action.
The goal of this paper is to come up with a quantitative assessment of the importance of
these and other social and political factors in determining the allocation of public goods,
both in absolute terms and relative to the extent to which there is a ”natural” tendency
towards convergence, reﬂecting perhaps the inﬂuence of the explicit commitments made by
the state.
3 Data
We have pooled secondary data from a wide variety of oﬃcial sources in order to control,
as carefully as possible, for the various inﬂuences on the availability of public goods. Most
of these data are originally available at the district-level. We ﬁrst discuss the original data
sources and then describe the procedure we used to map these data into parliamentary
constituencies. Electoral data is of course generated at the constituency level.
3.1 Public goods
Data on the availability of diﬀerent public goods is compiled by the Decennial Census of
India. This is known as village directory data and is available at the village level in the
District Census Handbook for each district in each census year. These data are obtained
from records kept with the block oﬃces and are not directly collected by the Census of India.
The public good categories listed in these data were standardized in 1971. In 1971 and 1991,
the data have been aggregated at the district level to generate the fraction of villages in the
district that have a particular public good. Data for the other years (1961 and 1981) are
available only in the District Census Handbooks. 11 We make some use of the 1961 data
11For 1971, they were compiled in an occasional paper—Oﬃce of the Registrar General, India (1987).
For 1991, we obtained the Data directly from Oﬃce of the Registrar General, India but these were also
subsequently published under Oﬃce of the Registrar General, India (1997).
9but are severely limited in the extent we can do so, because each state publishes ﬁgures on
diﬀerent sets of goods, and we could only match a few of these across the states.
We started with the entire set of public goods for which data is available in both censuses.12
To this list we added Primary Health Sub-Centers, which were the health facilities that
were introduced in the 1970s. As noted above, their introduction was accompanied by a re
positioning of the Primary Health Centers (PHCs) and perhaps the rest of the infrastructure
as well. 13 This raises the possibility that the health facilities listed in our data may not be
strictly comparable over the years.
The village directory data do not reveal whether or not a facility was funded and operated
by the state; only the total number of facilities are listed, irrespective of ownership and
management. In some cases, this is unambiguous since the categories were either created
by the state or provision was exclusively by the state. This is true for the diﬀerent types
of health centers, piped water, electricity, post oﬃces, phone connections and paved roads.
Private schools until the nineties were largely in urban India, and so it is likely that we are
measuring mainly state provision. In the case of dispensaries, hospitals, wells and tanks, we
are less sure. Hospitals tend to be state-owned and operated. There were a large number
of state-owned dispensaries,14 but there may also have been others. It is also possible that
some wells and tanks were constructed by particular groups within the village for their own
use and in these cases there is unlikely to have been open access to other villagers. We
present results for all listed categories, leaving it to the reader to interpret them with the
above caveats in mind.
Table 1a lists the fraction of Indian villages with diﬀerent types of infrastructural facilities
in 1971 and 1991 together with the standard deviation in availability across parliamentary
constituencies. Table 1b lists state-wise ﬁgures for selected public goods. The data certainly
shows abundant evidence that access to public investments is not uniform. In 1971 only 20%
12There are a total of 17 public good categories listed in the 1971 census. We exclude three of these:
colleges, post and telegraph oﬃces and the combined category of tubewells and handpumps. The ﬁrst of
these is essentially an urban facility. Even in 1991, less that 1% of Indian villages had a college. Post
and telegraph oﬃces are not listed in the 1991. Post oﬃces are listed in both years and we do use this as
one of our goods. The category is excluded because of classiﬁcation diﬀerences between the two years. In
1991 tubewells and handpumps are listed separately and there is no combined category. Since our data is
aggregated at the district level, we could not generate the combined ﬁgure.
13Nayyar(1991) discusses some of these changes in classiﬁcation of rural health facilities, pages 92-102.
14Figures for these can be found in the national Five Year Plans and in Nayyar (1991)
10of the villages in Himachal Pradesh had primary schools but 81% of villages in Maharashtra
and 95% of those in Kerala did. The variation within states in 1971 was almost as stark.
Uttar Pradesh, often cited as one of the more backward states of the country, had large areas
with no electricity in 1971 and others will over half of all villages covered. In Andhra Pradesh,
a state with relatively high levels of provison in 1971, constituencies in the north-eastern tip
had about one-third the coverage of those further down the same coastline. The expansion
was also very diﬀerent in diﬀerent places. It is certainly true that some states were much
more active than others in increasing coverage. The eastern state of Bihar and the western
state of Gujarat both had about 15% of their villages with electricity in 1971, with Gujarat
slightly behind Bihar. By 1991, almost every village in the Gujarat had electricity, while the
ﬁgure for Bihar had only risen to 40%. Phone connections spread from 4% to 28% of villages
in Gujarat while they remained under 2% in Bihar. In addition to state-level diﬀerences in
overall performance, there were clearly diﬀerences in priorities. Less than 1% of villages in
both Punjab and Madhya Pradesh had piped water in 1971; this facility spread to over a
quarter of all Punjab villages by 1991 but to less than 3% of villages in Madhya Pradesh.
In contrast, the availability post oﬃces in Punjab stayed almost unchanged, whereas the
number in Madhya Pradesh almost doubled. These variations underline the need to control
for state-eﬀects in our estimation strategy. We come back to this issue in Section 4.
3.2 Caste and religion
The social structure of Indian villages and its eﬀects on village life has been intensely studied
by anthropologists and the Indian caste system has functioned as the primary lens through
which village life has been observed. Hindus (the major religious group) are divided into a
number of castes, with strict and long-standing rules which govern their interaction. Mar-
riages rarely take place across caste boundaries and the sharing of food and other social
interaction dictated by the caste system. While there is some slow mobility of caste groups
in the hierarchy over long periods of time, there is almost no mobility of individuals across
these groups.15 Within villages, castes often inhabit diﬀerent hamlets and the distinction be-
15“Classes are- in principle and, to some extent, in practice- open; castes are not. One may change one’s
position from tenant to landowner, or from agricultural laborer to owner-cultivator. One cannot, however,
change from a Vellala into a Brahmin or from a Palla into a Vellala...Movement upwards or downwards
within the caste system is, in theory, inadmissible, although there is some movement in practice..Yet there
are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between social mobility in the caste system and social mobility in the class system.
11tween upper and lower castes is particularly sharp. Brahmans are traditionally placed at the
top of the caste hierarchy while those castes that are now listed in the Indian Constitution
as the Scheduled Castes have traditionally formed the bottom. There are also groups that
typically so marginal that they are excluded from the entire Hindu caste system; these are
now included in the list of Scheduled Tribes in Indian Constitution. Society is also divided
along religious lines, with Muslims, Christians, Jains and Sikhs being the major minority
religions.
Census data on the population fractions of Scheduled Castes and Tribes as well the diﬀerent
religions is available for all census years in Independent India. Scheduled Tribes tend to
be more localized than scheduled castes. There no Scheduled Tribes in 2 of the 16 major
states in our data set and about half of all the parliamentary constituencies in our data have
less that 1%. 16 The coeﬃcient of variation across parliamentary constituencies is 187% for
Scheduled Tribes and 53% for Scheduled Castes.
The last enumeration of caste is from the 1931 census.17 These data are available by districts,
separately for each of the British Indian provinces and princely states. While state bound-
aries were redrawn after independence, district boundaries in the former region of British
India remained relatively undisturbed, except for the princely states which were taken over
by the state after political independence. Between 1971 and 1991, a number of new districts
were created, mainly by sub-dividing old ones. For all new districts created after 1931, we
weight the caste ﬁgures from the original district according to the area of the new district
which was taken from them.
The number of castes listed in the 1931 is very large and we restrict ourselves to Hindu castes
which form more than 1% of the population of each state or province in 1931. Putting data for
diﬀerent states together, we have a total of 185 caste groups. We make one major adjustment
to this data to account for the increase in the proportion of Hindus after 1931. Some districts
had signiﬁcant Muslim populations which emigrated to the newly created nation of Pakistan
around the time of Indian independence in 1947. We scale up the numbers in each caste
group, based on the population share of Hindus in the current census. This assumes that
In the latter it is the individual who moves up or down, whereas in the former entire communities change
their position” Beteille, p. 190.
16This ﬁgure would be somewhat higher if we included the sparsely populated north-eastern states.
17Some caste data was collected by the 1941 census but it was never tabulated- a combined eﬀect of the
war combined with the volatile political situation in India.
12within Hindus, diﬀerent castes grew at similar rates over time. While this is certainly not
true of urban India, we hope that this is a reasonable approximation for rural areas. There
is no data on group wise variations in fertility and migration rates that would allow us to be
able to do much more.
To measure caste and religious heterogeneity, we mainly use the fractionalization index,






where si refers to the population share of the ith group. We assume that each Hindu caste
is a separate group, but that all the other religious groups are internally homogenous. This
is clearly an extreme assumption. There are caste divisions among Muslims and Sikhs—
but they not religiously sanctioned and appear to be less politically salient. There are also
Hindu castes that work well together, but this is highly contextual and impossible to predict
on a priori grounds. The census has a 7-fold classiﬁcation of religion. There are 5 sizable
religious minorities: Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains. All other religions
are in a separate category, as are those who do not state their religion. In constructing our
measure we use shares of each of these 7 categories in addition to shares in each of our caste
categories. For religions the shares are contemporaneous and for castes, they are based on
the 1931 data in the manner described above. Our data conﬁrm the idea that Indian society
is extremely fragmented. In terms of magnitudes, our measure of heterogeneity (the standard
ethnic fractionalization index) has a mean of .9 in 1971, compared to the mean value of .26
for US cities that Alesina, Baqir and Easterly report. It ranges from 0.2 to nearly 1.
In this context of sharp divides between diﬀerent groups, many of the eﬀects of heterogeneity
alluded to in the last section may be present. There is anecdotal evidence, mainly from village
studies, that diﬀerent castes often use diﬀerent water sources and, because of norms that limit
the entry of lower castes into upper caste neighborhoods, the location of schools and other
public places within villages inﬂuences their use. Changes in village leadership have often
been accompanied by a change in the location of the public building where village meetings
are held.18 Political parties often pledge allegiance to particular caste groups and their
18Beteille (1969) in his classic study of a village in south India describes the way in which temples,
meeting rooms and the elementary school are strategically located to make access easy for particular castes.
He also ﬁnds that social cleavages are heightened as villages participate in political activity. “As the election
campaign mounts, people tend to identify themselves progressively with one party or another. The cleavages
within the village community are more sharply focused, and the links between political interest and social
13interests and in fact many have argued increased rural involvement in politics has sharpened
social caste and communal divides.19 Fukunaga(1993), in his study of village factions in
Uttar Pradesh, describes how development projects introduced in the 1970s created large
potential rents for those who administered them in the village. This led to increased political
activity which was almost always along group lines. The lower castes, who had shown little
interest in earlier elections were now mobilized by those seeking political oﬃce.
In estimating the growth equation we will rely on changes in the fragmentation index. Since
all our caste data are historical, changes in this variable are driven mainly by changes in the
fraction of diﬀerent religions. These changes do show some variability across constituencies,
but are typically very small. This needs to be kept in mind when interpreting the coeﬃcients
on social fragmentation from equation 6.
3.3 Land distribution
Gini coeﬃcients have been tabulated from data on the number of operated landholdings.
These data are from the Agricultural Census of India which is held every 5 years. Published
data are not systematically available. Most states publish State Statistical Abstracts which
contain selected data from the past agricultural census. In a few cases, we were not able
to ﬁnd published data corresponding to both 1971 and 1991 and use data from the closest
year for which they are available. We include agricultural labor and assign it zero holdings.
We also have to make some other adjustments because the reports contain only the total
number of holdings within a certain size category and these categories are not always the
same for all the states. The Gini coeﬃcient of the land distribution so generated goes from
0.33 to an impressively high 0.89 in 1971. There is very little overall change in this measure
of land inequality between the two census years.20
Data on operational holdings is clearly a less than perfect substitute for what we really
structure are brought to the surface” (p. 179)
19“In Rampura in 1948, inter-caste relations were on the whole cooperative if not friendly...But with the
introduction of adult franchise and of the electoral principle into panchayats and other local self-governing
institutions, tensions between the castes increased sharply” (Srinivas, p150). Also see Singh (1993).
20The change in land inequality which we observe over the period may be understated because of missing
data for 1971. All the 16 states which we consider have published land data for 1991, but only 7 of them
have it for 1971, and for these states we simply use ﬁgures from subsequent years.
14want, which is the data on ownership holdings. Fragmented holdings and tenancy both
create a wedge between these two measures. Our only defense is that tenancy has declined
enormously in India since independence and most land is now owner cultivated, sometimes
based on hired labor.
3.4 Geography and demographics
The decennial census contains the average village population and the number of villages in
each district.
We use several variables to control for geography. These, by construction, do not vary
over time in our data set and are meant to capture geographical terrain and other roughly
ﬁxed characteristics which may inﬂuence the need for diﬀerent types of public goods and
the ease with which they can be provided. The 1991 Census lists minimum and maximum
temperatures for all urban agglomerations. For each district, we use temperature ﬁgures
for the administrative capital. Our Figures for normal annual rainfall by district are from
the Indian Meteorological Department and are based on average rainfall over the period
1940-1990. We use 3 variables that capture the geographical characteristics of land that is
neither cultivated nor under forest; the district’s area which is barren or rocky, that which
is largely sandy and mountainous areas. These are from the Wasteland Atlas of India for
the year 2000. They are published by the Ministry of Rural Development and are based on
satellite data put together by the National Remote Sensing Agency in India.
In addition, we use a dummy for constituencies which are on the coast.
3.5 Political Variables
Party shares and turnouts are available for parliamentary constituencies from the Election
Commission of India. For elections in 1971 and 1991, these data have been tabulated by
Butler, Lahiri and Roy in their book India Decides(1991). For each constituency, this book
lists the shares of the ﬁve biggest parties, and clubs the rest together in a sixth category
(others). In contrast to district boundaries, there have been relatively few changes in con-
stituency boundaries since 1971. There were 518 constituencies in 1971, this number went
15up to 542 after the Delimitation order of 1976 and then to 543 in 1991. For newly created
constituencies, the book lists the vote shares from the constituencies from which the new
constituency was created, so we are always dealing with ﬁgures for the 543 constituencies
for all election years. Of these 543, 517 are in 16 largest states (with more than 95% of
the country’s population). These are what we work with. We therefore leave out Kashmir,
which is politically very diﬀerent from the rest of India and which did not have a census in
1991 due to political unrest. We also leave out the Northeastern states (with the exception
of Assam), which are ethnically quite distinct. Some regions of the country, were governed
directly by the government at the Center during the period of this study. We also ignore
these.
There were general elections in 1971 and 1991. We use electoral data for these years to com-
pute two measures of political competition. The ﬁrst is the share of total votes received by
the winning party in each constituency. The second is a measure of political fragmentation,
very similar in its construction to our social fragmentation measure described above and used
widely in the literature on comparative politics (Rae, 1971). We use the vote shares of the
ﬁve biggest parties in each constituency and combine all other votes into a sixth category.
Our measure is then






where vi refers to the vote share of the ith party.
The average vote share of the winning party in 1971 was 55% and the mean political frag-
mentation was .56. Consistent with commentaries on changes in Indian politics over the
next two decades, we ﬁnd a rise in political fragmentation and a fall in the average vote
share of the winning party. The rise in political fragmentation occurred in all states with
the exception of West Bengal and Kerela, which have traditionally been controlled by the
political Left.
163.6 Mapping District Data into Parliamentary Constituencies
We used two diﬀerent procedures for creating constituency level data from district data. For
variables like rainfall and average village population, where averages rather than numbers
were available at the district level, we generated a weighted average using the share of each
constituency that came from various districts. For public goods, religion, caste, Scheduled
Castes and tribes, the number of villages, and other variables where the total numbers were
available for each district, we generated the total number per constituency by attaching
weights to districts based on the share of the district that went to each constituency. These
weights were based on the fraction of the area of each district that goes into a constituency.
There are two main sources of errors that may creep in. First, we did not have accurate
areas for constituencies and therefore made the assignment by visually comparing maps of
districts and constituencies. Second, the degree of urbanization varies across the district
and so if a district is split during our period, it is hard to make the 1971 and 1991 ﬁgures
comparable. We arrived at our ﬁnal map after a few iterations, during which we tried to




The relationship in levels we are interested in estimating takes the form
yijkt = fit(pjkt,ejkt,xjkt,sk,εijkt) (3)
where yijkt is the share of villages with the ith public good in the jth constituency in the
kth state in census year t, pjkt is a set of population characteristics of the constituency in
year t (share of Scheduled Castes and tribes, share of brahmans, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs,
caste and religious fragmentation, Gini coeﬃcient of land-holdings, average population of
a village (in thousands), the number of villages in a constituency (in thousands)), ejkt is a
set of election outcomes in year t, xjt is a vector of geographical characteristics (rainfall,
minimum and maximum temperature, the fraction under the 3 types of wasteland and a
17dummy for constituencies which have a coastline), sk is a dummy for the state, and εijkt is
a constituency and good speciﬁc shock.
Since yijtis a share, a natural structure for estimating this relationship would be to use a
logit model. However the variables we are interested in are usually reasonably far from the
limits, so we opt for a linear probability model, which is convenient in several ways: First
because it is easier to interpret the coeﬃcients. Second, given that both the 1971 and 1991
levels are captured by the same linear model, the change between the two years also follows
a linear model, a feature that the logit model does not have. However as a speciﬁcation
check we will also estimate these relationships based on a logit model.
Under the linear probability model assumption
yijkt = αitpjkt + βitejkt + γitxjkt + σitsk + εijkt (4)
We begin by estimating this relationship by ordinary least squares in the 1971 cross-section:
this is exactly what the literature does. Our base speciﬁcation includes the full range of ge-
ographical controls, the shares of brahmans, Scheduled Castes and Tribes, Muslims, Chris-
tians, Sikhs, the caste and religious fragmentation measure, the Gini coeﬃcient, the size
of the average village in the constituency and the number of villages in the average con-
stituency. We always include state dummies, to control for systematic diﬀerences across
states. This is necessary because states may have diﬀerent deﬁnitions of what they call
middle schools or hospitals. Also most public goods investment decisions are by the state
government and therefore the competition for public goods takes place at the state level.
We estimate additional speciﬁcations that include measures of electoral competition—the
political fragmentation measure, the share of the winning party—in the 1971 elections.
If we assume that this kind of relationship holds in both 1971 and 1991, we can diﬀerence
them to get the growth equation:
yijkt+1 − yijkt = ∆yijkt = (αit+1 − αit)pjkt + αit+1∆pjkt + (βit+1 − βit)ejkt + βit+1∆ejkt
+ (γit+1 − γit)xjkt + (σit+1 − σit)sk + εijkt+1 − εijkt (5)
under the presumption that the geographical variables do not change over time. However
we do not have values of ∆pjkt for all the variables in p. In particular, this is true for the
18share of Brahmans which is based entirely on data from 1931. In our base speciﬁcation we
estimate this equation by omitting ∆pjkt for this variable. In addition, our base speciﬁcation
for the growth equation includes yijk71 as a control, in order to examine the possibility
of convergence. Given that our dependent variable is typically increasing over time and
bounded, convergence is almost unavoidable.21 The basic equation we estimate is therefore
yijk91 − yijk71 =∆yijk71 = ξijkyijk71 + b αipjk71 + αi∆pjk71 + b βiejk71 + βi∆ejk71
+ b γixjk71 + b σisk + b εijk71 (6)
4.2 Identiﬁcation issues
Since we do not have a quasi-experiment here, the interpretation of our results will depend on
how far we succeed in controlling for omitted sources of variation. In all our speciﬁcations we
control for a range of geographical variables, including rainfall, the maximum and minimum
temperature, whether it lies on the coast, whether the area is classiﬁed as barren/rocky
or sandy and ﬁnally whether the terrain is described as steep-sloping. We also control for
population density—by including the average population of a village in the constituency.
The size of the constituency is also controlled for, by including the number of villages in a
constituency. However we are concerned with the endogeneity of both these variables, and
therefore check the robustness of our results by excluding them.
We are also concerned about the possibility that the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable
on the right-hand-side can be a source of bias; in order to make sure that this is not too
much of an issue we instrument the 1971 value, yijkt by its lagged value, wherever we have
the relevant data and check that the results are unchanged. Finally since this is data from
rural India and agricultural productivity is mainstay of the rural economy we estimate a
speciﬁcation where we include the average agricultural yield in the constituency over the
1956-61 period. While there is an obvious danger of productivity being caused by the public
goods outcomes, the fact that the yield numbers are from the period before the expansion
of public goods helps.
In addition our model nests the model where there is a district ﬁxed eﬀect, but we do not
21In eﬀect we are assuming that the 1971 level enters the 1991 level equation without a corresponding
term in the 1971 level equation -we are limited by the data we have.
19impose the restriction that the coeﬃcients are constant over time. Given that this evolution is
happening in an environment where the political forces are getting radically realigned (this is
the period when India goes from almost total domination by the Congress Party to a genuine
multi-party state), it seems implausible that the coeﬃcients would remain unchanged.
It is obviously not clear that all the unobserved variation can be captured by a constituency
ﬁxed eﬀect (plus the noise term): after all shifts in the population distribution of a speciﬁc
community or caste could easily reﬂect changes in the political climate of the district, which
also aﬀects access to public goods. Indeed we feel that endogeneity may be a more serious
problem for the changes than for the levels; this is because, excepting in the partition years,
population movements in rural India have been slow . The variation in the levels therefore
reﬂect mainly the long-term inﬂuences on India’s population, which need not have much to
do with the ability to claim public goods (especially when we use the 1931 shares). The
changes after 1971, on the other hand, might very well be in response to changes in the
access to public goods. Finally, while the Indian census ﬁgures are generally reliable, it is
likely that the changes are more inﬂuenced by measurement error than the levels. Therefore
while there are good reasons to worry about unobserved constituency characteristics, it is
not entirely clear that the growth results are obviously more reliable than the results from
the level equations. However as we will see, they paint a relatively consistent picture: we
will therefore focus mainly on the growth results.
Turning to the variables of interest, the caste variables that go into the construction of the
caste and religious fragmentation are from the 1931 census and are therefore less likely to
be picking up the inﬂuences of other, more contemporary, forces in the area. Unfortunately
we cannot really do this for the other demographic variables: the shares of the diﬀerent
religions have changed enormously after partition, while the categories of Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes were deﬁned after partition.22
We are also directly interested in how the presence of speciﬁc castes and religious groups
aﬀects access to public goods (over and above the inﬂuence of heterogeneity). In addition
we need to include the shares of diﬀerent groups to ensure that the fragmentation measure
is picking up heterogeneity and not the presence of speciﬁc groups.
22In principle, we could get the list of Scheduled Castes and Tribes from each state and use it to construct
the shares of these groups in 1931, but we have not been able to get the data to do this.
20Our base speciﬁcation also includes controls for electoral outcomes in the constituency,
though we also estimate a speciﬁcation where the electoral variables are dropped, on the
grounds that these outcome are likely to be more endogenous than the demographic struc-
tures.
Finally it is worth noting that we do not control for the two historical variables emphasized
in Banerjee (2004)—the type of land tenure system established by the British in the con-
stituency, and whether the constituency was under direct British rule.23 The reason is that
neither of these vary over time.
4.3 The problem of substitution
Even if we correctly estimate the eﬀect of the right-hand side variables, it is not always clear
what we should make of the results. The problem is that while we expect certain types of
districts to have less public goods in general there is no guarantee that they will get less of
every public good. In fact they may be given more of some public goods precisely because
they have less of others. This may be, for example, a part of some political mechanism aimed
at making sure that they do not become too unhappy. Or it could be a part of an attempt
to deal with the consequences of the lack of other public goods. For example, a village that
has no hospital is probably more likely to get a health center.
This kind of substitution is obviously a problem for this entire literature. To take an example,
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), who were the ﬁrst to run this kind of regression on micro
data, actually found evidence of substitution: In their data (which is from the US) ethnic
diversity leads to a reduction in spending on sewerage and trash pickup, education, welfare,
ﬁre protection and roads, but it leads to an increase in spending on health and police and
it is not clear that those are less useful.24
It is however probably less of a problem for our exercise because unlike Alesina et al., who
23The land tenure variable was ﬁrst emphasized by Banerjee and Iyer (2003), while the non-British variable
is from Iyer (2003).
24The fact other studies do not ﬁnd similar evidence of substitution might reﬂect the fact that they only
look at a subset of public goods, and it is not implausible, given that they can only look at some public
goods, that they would focus on the ones where they have reason to believe that they will ﬁnd what they
are looking for.
21focus on how the share of spending on diﬀerent public goods varies across diﬀerent cities, we
are interested in the share of villages in a constituency that have a particular public good.
The shares clearly have add up to implying that there has to be some substitution across
goods, whereas, given that most villages had few of the listed health facilities in 1971, and
access to all of them was being expanded, it is quite plausible that a favored constituency
would gain along all the health dimensions over the next twenty years. Indeed as we will
note later, densely populated areas have more of almost all public goods and signiﬁcantly
less of none of them.
Another way to deal with this problem, suggested in Banerjee and Somanathan (2001), is to
use the fact that the Scheduled Tribes in India tend to be the single weakest political group
of any size and therefore are unlikely to have much access to the most desirable public goods.
If we accept that less access to public goods should be interpreted as less access to the most
desired public goods deﬁned thus, we could focus on the goods for which the Scheduled Tribe
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly negative in the 1971 level regressions. The results for this subset
of goods, it can be checked from tables, are very similar to the results for the entire group
for which we have data—we therefore reports results for the full set of goods.
4.4 Hypotheses
With the caveat in the previous sub-section, our main hypotheses are the following: First,
areas with a higher than average presence of Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes, histor-
ically the two weakest social groups in India, will do worse than average in terms of access
to public goods; this eﬀect should be strongest for the Scheduled Tribes because they tend
to be concentrated in certain districts, while the Scheduled Castes tend to be dispersed and
therefore can beneﬁt from the presence of other, better-connected, groups.
Second, areas with a higher than average presence of Brahmans, the traditional elite caste,
should have better access to public goods than the average area and areas dominated by
Muslims, the main politically identiﬁed minority group, should have worse. However the
authority of the Brahmans has been challenged by the rise of the middle castes over the course
of the 20th century (the Dravidian movement in Tamil Nadu, being the most famous example
of this challenge) and it is often alleged that Muslims often wield inﬂuence disproportionate
to their numbers by virtue of voting as a block. Therefore both these eﬀects may be fairly
22weak.
Third, areas with a high degree of caste and religious fragmentation should have worse access
to public goods.
Fourth, areas with a high level of political competition, as measured by our measure of
political fragmentation should have better access to public goods.
Fifth, areas where the population density is high, as measured by the population of the
average village, ought to have more public goods, if only because our measure, which just
looks for whether a village has at least one of a particular good, directly favors larger villages.
In addition, we will be interested in whether more or less unequal districts (as measured by
the Gini coeﬃcient of landholdings) get more access to public goods. Here, as the literature
has emphasized,25 there are two competing eﬀects: High inequality might help accessing
public goods, because the poor can beneﬁt from the eﬀorts of the rich on their own behalf
(assuming that the rich are more eﬀective in getting public goods). High inequality might
also hurt, much as caste heterogeneity might, because there is more conﬂict between the
stake-holders.
Finally, in the growth regressions we will be interested in the extent to which there is
convergence or divergence: i.e. do poorly endowed districts catch up with the better endowed
districts.
In the 1971 level regressions, our hypotheses predict the signs of the level of the variable
coeﬃcient, while in the change regressions the immediate implication is about the coeﬃcient
on the changes in the variables of interest. We have no clear predictions about the coeﬃcient
on the levels of these variables in the change regressions (b α and b β) in equation 6, since it
would require us to have a prior about whether some were becoming more important over
time, or less important.
25See Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2000).
235 Results
5.1 1971 results
The results from estimating equation 4 are reported in Tables 2a-d. Of these Table 2a
reports on the three education public goods, while Table 2b reports on the 5 health variables,
Table 2c reports on the 3 water variables and Table 2d reports on the 4 communication and
transport variables. For brevity, we discuss only those coeﬃcients here which are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10% level or higher. Details on the others are in the tables.
The results are remarkably consistent with our hypotheses above: among the ﬁfteen goods
for which we have 1971 data, the share of Scheduled Tribes is negative in ten cases. For
Scheduled Castes, it is negative for eight goods and positive for two. The share of Muslims
is negative for seven goods and that of Christians is positive for the same seven. The share
of Brahmans is positive for six goods and negative for three.
Caste and religious fragmentation is negative in six cases and positive in two. Of the political
variables, the size of the constituency is negative in eight cases and positive in two. The
political fragmentation variable is however positive and negative in equal numbers of cases
(two each).
These results, are largely what we would have expected, excepting in the case of the Brah-
mans, where the evidence seems to suggest that their inﬂuence was perhaps more limited
than we might have expected. We also see that Gini Coeﬃcient is positive in eight of the 15
cases and never negative. In other words, areas that were more unequal in 1971 had better
access to public goods.
Population density has a very strong positive eﬀect on access to public goods, suggesting
that ease of delivery may be an important part of the decision to provide public goods:
clearly it is easier to serve a lot of people when they are all in one place. Also, the norms
that were set out in the Five Year Plans were often in terms of ensuring provision to villages
of a certain size.
Geography matters relatively little except for rainfall which has a positive eﬀect, areas under
sands, which is also positive and being coastal which, somewhat surprisingly, has a negative
24eﬀect.
5.2 Growth results
Results from estimating the growth equation 6 are reported in Tables 3a-3e: the division
of the goods exactly parallels that in Table 2, with the one diﬀerence that we know have
data for 6 health goods (the additional one being Primary Health Sub-centers which were
not listed in 1971).26
Our results in Table 3e show strong evidence for convergence. The 1971 level of the good is
negative and signiﬁcant in 12 of the 15 goods and positive in one.
The coeﬃcient on the diﬀerences, αi and βi in equation 6, are supposed to provide us with
estimates of αi91 and βi91 in ??, while the coeﬃcient on the 1971 levels in the growth equation
(b α and b β in 6) is supposed to tell us the diﬀerence between the 1971 coeﬃcient and the 1991
coeﬃcients. In Table 3a-3d we report, for the variables of interest, the coeﬃcients on the
1991 variables estimated from the growth equation, the change in the coeﬃcient between
1971 and 1991 estimated by the growth equation, and for comparison, the 1971 coeﬃcients
estimated from equation 4 (reported in the previous sub-section).
We ﬁrst note that while the 1971 and 1991 results are broadly similar, there are important
diﬀerences between them. The 1991 coeﬃcients tell us, consistent with the 1971 results, that
districts with Scheduled Tribe concentrations tend to do worse than average. Also consistent
with the 1971 results is the fact that population density is associated with higher access .
Political fragmentation in 1991, as in 1971, does not seem to aﬀect the provision of most
goods.
In contrast with the 1971 results, neither socio-religious fragmentation nor a Muslim pres-
ence makes a systematic diﬀerence in either direction. Finally the share of Scheduled Castes
whenever statistically signigicant is positive, while in the 1971 level regressions it was system-
atically negative. The same pattern is repeated with the Gini Coeﬃcient growth variable,
which is negative in ﬁve cases and positive in two, whereas the 1971 level coeﬃcient was
26The institution of a Sub-center was introduced in the 1970s; for this reason there is no convergence term
in the Sub-center equation.
25emphatically positive.
One possible interpretation of these numbers is that the true coeﬃcients actually changed
signs between 1971 and 1991. This is something we can check, because as noted above,
we have estimates of the change in the coeﬃcient. We therefore ask whether, in all cases
where the 1991 coeﬃcient was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, if the direction of change in
the coeﬃcient could explain the diﬀerence between the estimated 1971 and 1991 coeﬃcients.
As we can see from Tables 3a-3d, this works rather well: in every single case in which the
Scheduled Tribe coeﬃcient was more negative in 1991 than 1971, the predicted direction
of change is indeed negative; of the four goods for which the Scheduled Caste coeﬃcient is
signiﬁcant in 1991, the predicted direction of change is wrong in only one; and so on, for the
other coeﬃcients. There is no sharp inconsistency between the two sets of results.
What is clear however is that the 1991 results that we get from the growth regression are
less likely to be signiﬁcant than the 1971 results that we get from the 1971 level equations.
This might reﬂect the fact that the 1991 results are identiﬁed from changes, which are
sometimes quite small. It might also reﬂect the fact that the 1971 results are biased because
the independent variables are correlated with district ﬁxed eﬀects. Finally it could reﬂect
the fact that changes are less well measured.
Given that the two sets of results are broadly consistent, in the rest of the paper we will
focus on the 1991 results that we get from the equation (6). These results suggest that the
one signiﬁcant section of Indian society that seems unambiguously disadvantaged in terms
of their political clout are the Scheduled Tribes. This contrasts with the other designated
“disadvantaged group”, the Scheduled Castes, who seem to be doing quite well in recent
years, as well as the biggest minority group, the Muslims, who seem to be doing no worse
than the rest.
The fact that the Scheduled Tribe areas do so much worse than the rest while the Scheduled
Castes do better, is consistent with the fact, observed above, that Scheduled Tribes tend to
be concentrated geographically, whereas the Scheduled Castes are much less so. It is possible
that this hurts them because the areas where they live also tend to be remote, but given
that we have detailed geographical controls (which, by the way, do not seem to matter very
much for access to public goods), this is unlikely to be the main reason. It is more plausible
that the gap between Scheduled Tribes and the Scheduled Castes, reﬂects the fact that the
26Scheduled Castes live in areas where other, more powerful groups are also located, whereas
the Scheduled Tribes tend to be isolated. However this too cannot be the entire story since
Scheduled areas actually do better than the average constituency over the 1971-91 period.
One possibility is that at least by 1991, the Scheduled Castes had actually become quite
good at articulating their demands within the Indian political framework, which would be
consistent with the fact that in 1990s a Scheduled Caste party (BS) came to rule India’s
most populous state. Alternatively, the main impetus might have come from above: This was
also a period when the Indian state was making a conscious attempt to deal with historical
inequities, as reﬂected by the attempt to implement the Mandal Commission report by the
V.P. Singh Government in 1990 and The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Moreover there is evidence that these kinds of targeted interventions
were quite eﬀective: Pande (2003) shows that the policies reserving seats in the legislatures
for Scheduled Castes has had a signiﬁcant impact on transfers to Scheduled Castes.
The only other robust inﬂuence on access to public goods among variables that we have
looked at here, is land inequality. The coeﬃcient on this variable, is typically negative in
the growth equations, suggesting that more unequal villages ﬁnd it harder to act together.
The fact that the political fragmentation variable has no eﬀect is also notable, especially given
the fact the political divisions often mirror caste and religious divisions and these kinds of
social divisions do seem to matter. However it is worth pointing out that to the extent that
variation in political fragmentation reﬂects variation in social fragmentation we might expect
its eﬀect to be negative, while to the extent that it reﬂects exogenous variation in the extent
of political competition, we would expect it to have a positive eﬀect. On balance it is not
clear which way the net eﬀect should go (we do control for social fragmentation but there
is obviously no guarantee that we have controlled for the right measure of fragmentation).
Political fragmentation may also mean that the government is sustained by coalition of
parties and is therefore unstable and weak. In this case fragmentation will be undesirable,
because it goes with ineﬀective governments, instead of reﬂecting a competitive political
environment and therefore being desirable.
Finally, we note that in a number of cases the change in the coeﬃcients between 1971 and
1991 is signiﬁcant: The strongest results are that the Scheduled Tribe coeﬃcient and (less
clearly) the socio-religious fragmentation coeﬃcient has tended to become more negative,
while the Brahman coeﬃcient and the population density variables have become more posi-
27tive. There is thus no reason to think that social structure is about to become irrelevant.
5.3 Robustness
Table 4 reports results from a number of attempts to check the robustness of the conclusions
drawn in the previous sub-section. The ﬁrst two columns of the table report the results of
our basic speciﬁcation for the two variables for which we get the most striking results—the
share of Scheduled Tribes and the 1971 level of access to that public good, measured, as
usual, by the size of an average village.
The next two columns report coeﬃcients for when we include a control for the average
agricultural yield in the constituency. This was constructed using district level data from
the India Agriculture and Climate Data Set assembled by the World Bank. Since we are
using rural data, yield, one might expect, is one of the most important determinants of the
economic power of the area, which is potentially an important inﬂuence on access to public
goods. To minimize the risk of over-controlling (yield after all is aﬀected by the presence
of many of the public goods) we use the average yield from the 1956 to 1961 period, which
predates the growth in public goods that is our independent variable. The yield itself comes
in negative, which tells us that the inﬂuence of yield became less positive (or more negative)
over the 1971-1991 period, which is consistent with the view that there is a lot of convergence.
The results, for both the outcomes are very similar to those in columns 1 and 2. The point
estimates have the same sign and are similar in magnitude.
In the next two columns we investigate what happens when we instrument for the 1971
level of the public good in equation (6) by the corresponding level in 1961, to deal with
the usual problem of correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term.
The results are in columns 5 and 6 for the 9 goods for which we have 1961 data. We
clearly lose some precision by doing this, but the estimated coeﬃcients for the 1971 level
variable (which measures convergence) in column 6 usually have the same sign as the ones
in column 2, and are about equally likely to be larger and smaller (and are statistically
indistinguishable), suggesting that there is no systematic bias. For the Scheduled Tribe
variable, we unfortunately have data only for one of the six goods where the variable is
signiﬁcant in column 1; in that one case, the results in columns 1 and 5 are very similar
28indeed.
Columns 7 and 8 report results on a regression where we drop both the population density
and the number of villages in a district. Our qualitative results are mostly intact. The
Scheduled Tribes coeﬃcient is negative in six cases (with one diﬀerence in the set of goods
for which this is the case) and positive in the same one good- health Centers. Convergence
is seen in ten of the ﬁfteen goods we have in 1971. The opposite is true for the same one
good, tapped water, as in the original speciﬁcation.
We performed a number of other speciﬁcation checks, not reported here. One is to replace
the political fragmentation variable with a variable that measures the share of the vote that
went to the winning party or a variable that measure the gap between the vote share of the
winning party and the share of the second biggest party. None of these work any better
than the fragmentation variable. Finally we try a speciﬁcation where we drop the political
fragmentation variable, on the grounds that it might be endogenous. The other results
remain almost entirely unaﬀected.
5.4 Magnitude of the Impact
Table 5 reports, for each public good, the three exogenous variables that have the largest
impact on access to that good, where impact is measured by αi (or βi) in equation (6)
multiplied by one standard deviation of variable i (in 1991 levels). We see that a constituency
that has one standard deviation more of (say) villages that had the good in 1971 may have
16 percentage points less growth in villages with electricity. The impact is enormous, as
might be expected given that the convergence coeﬃcient is almost two-thirds. For 11 of the
15 goods, the biggest impact is that of convergence, and its impact is often many times that
of the next most important inﬂuence.
Other variables that have a large impact are the share of Scheduled Tribes (almost always
negative), share of Sikhs and Christians (no clear sign pattern), population density (al-
ways positive) and caste and religious fragmentation (usually negative). Overall, the results
suggest that while social and demographic factors continue to have a big eﬀect, the most
important factor in the majority of the cases is convergence.
296 Conclusion
Our results suggest that while social divisions are indeed important, they do not have to
be immutable structures that freeze the economy into permanent underdevelopment. Indian
society is among the most divided anywhere, and the roots of these divisions go back thou-
sands of years. Yet there has been much progress towards equalizing access, as evidenced by
the broad convergence and the high growth in Scheduled Caste areas.
The Scheduled Tribes, who seem to be diverging from the rest of society over the period
we study, are the one exception to this pattern. It is possible however that this period of
Scheduled Tribe backwardness has now ended with the creation of two separate, Scheduled
Tribe dominated, States; Jharkhand and Chattisgarh.
This may however be too optimistic a view of the evidence: the problem is that the con-
vergence has taken place in outcomes that are relatively easy to deliver: Schools are easy to
build. Getting good teachers to them is harder. A similar analysis of the welfare outcomes
that are aﬀected by these public goods might suggest a very diﬀerent picture, because, for
example, empty school buildings do not improve education.
The one piece of evidence we can use to address this issue is the evidence on literacy. A
regression of the change in literacy at the constituency level between 1971 and 1991 on the
same set of right hand side variables as the ones used in the basic growth regression, suggests
results that are closely aligned with our public good results: Scheduled Tribe areas are falling
behind in literacy as well (so are the Muslims, who are however not falling behind in access
to public goods), while Scheduled Castes, are, if anything, improving their literacy faster
than the rest. However clearly this is just one piece of evidence and literacy is probably the
one welfare outcome that is relatively easily changed. Other measures of education may be
much more sensitive to the quality of education that is being provided.
It is therefore clearly too early to declare victory over the forces of historical inequity in
India, at least in terms of access to public goods. On the other hand, it does suggest that
getting the state to make explicit commitments may be important in ﬁghting these inequities;
commitments that will increasingly have to be based on the quality of these goods rather
than on physical access.
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331971 1991
Primary Schools 0.53 0.73
(0.20) (0.16)
Middle Schools 0.08 0.19
(0.17) (0.20)
High Schools 0.04 0.08
(0.13) (0.16)






Maternity and Child Welfare Centers 0.01 0.02
(0.05) (0.06)
Family Planning Centers 0.01 0.02
(0.10) (0.07)
Piped Water 0.02 0.18
(0.07) (0.24)






Post Offices 0.15 0.22
(0.18) (0.24)
Phone Collections 0.01 0.06
(0.07) (0.16)
Paved Roads 0.25 0.37
(0.19) (0.25)
Primary Health Sub-centers 0.07
(0.10)
Number of Villages 551640 565092
(788) (794)
Table 1a: The Fraction of Indian Villages with Different Types of Public Goods, 1971-1991.
Notes: The fractions of each good are taken directly from the Census of India. The figures in 
parentheses are standard deviations over parliamentary constituencies. The last row refers to the 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Maternity and Child Welfare Centers -0.45**
(0.19)
















Coefficients and standard errors on the initial level of each public good  ( from the estimation of 
equation 6)
Table 3e: Convergence in the Availability of Public Goods, 1971-1991.
Note: * and ** indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level 
respectively.
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